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        銆12鏈4鏃ャ 銆怌EMA鐮旇浼2019绉嬪绗崄涓夎銆 Confusion and Competition

        鍙戝竷鏃ユ湡锛2019-11-28  鐐瑰嚮鏁帮細

        璁烘枃棰樼洰锛欳onfusion and Competition

        鎶ュ憡浜猴細鍒樼儊锛堝寳浜ぇ瀛﹀厜鍗庣鐞嗗闄㈠簲鐢ㄧ粡娴庣郴鍔╃悊鏁欐巿锛

        璁烘枃鎽樿锛欴o firms seek to make a market transparent or do they want to manipulate the perception of product characteristics? Contrary to the well-studied case of homogeneous goods, obfuscation is not necessarily an equilibrium phenomenon in markets with differentiated goods. In particular, if the taste distribution is polarized, so that indifferent consumers are relatively rare, firms seek to educate consumers. However, if the taste distribution features a concentration of indecisive consumers, confusion is beneficial for firms and obfuscation an equilibrium strategy. The adverse welfare consequences of obfuscation can be more severe than with homogeneous goods, as consumers may not only pay higher prices, but also choose a dominated option or deny choice altogether. Our model can also be adapted to offer new insights on the incentives for political candidates to induce polarized opinions by confusing voters.

        鏃堕棿锛12鏈4鏃ワ紙鍛ㄤ笁锛変腑鍗12:10-13:30

        鍦扮偣锛氬闄㈠崡璺牎鍖哄鏈細鍫712

        鎶ュ憡浜虹畝浠嬶細鍒樼儊锛2019骞存瘯涓氫簬鐟炲+鑻忛粠涓栧ぇ瀛︾粡娴庣郴锛岃幏鍗氬+瀛︿綅锛岀幇涓哄寳浜ぇ瀛﹀厜鍗庣鐞嗗闄㈠簲鐢ㄧ粡娴庣郴鍔╃悊鏁欐巿銆傜洰鍓嶄富瑕佺爺绌堕鍩熶负缁勭粐缁忔祹瀛︼紝浜т笟缁勭粐鐞嗚锛屾満鍒惰璁″拰鍗氬紙璁恒傜爺绌舵垚鏋滃彂琛ㄦ垨鍗冲皢鍙戣〃浜嶵heoretical Economics, RAND Journal of Economics, Games and Economic Behavior, Economic Theory绛夊浗闄呯煡鍚嶅鏈湡鍒娿

        涓诲姙锛氫腑鍥界粡娴庝笌绠$悊鐮旂┒闄

        杩斿洖涓婁竴椤

        瀛﹂櫌鍗楄矾鏍″尯鍦板潃锛氬寳浜競娴锋穩鍖哄闄㈠崡璺39鍙
        閭紪锛100081

        娌欐渤鏍″尯鍦板潃锛氬寳浜競鏄屽钩鍖烘矙娌抽珮鏁欏洯鍖
        閭紪锛102206

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